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The Constitutionality of Tax Relief for Parents of
Children Attending Public and Nonpublic Schools
The persistent desire of lawmakers to assist nonpublic'
schools and the parents and students who patronize those
schools 2 has manifested itself in various statutes providing
state aid to nonpublic education.3 Opponents of such aid have
been equally persistent in asserting that these statutes violate
the establishment clause of the first amendment.4 Although
the United States Supreme Court has invalidated a number of
state aid provisions,5 the Court has upheld several state stat-
1. Although public aid to nonpublic schools raises many policy issues,
this Note only addresses the constitutional implications of state aid to nonpub-
lic sectarian schools. One reason for this focus lies in the overwhelmingly sec-
tarian nature of American nonpublic schools; by the early 1960's, more than
90% of the 5.6 million American children enrolled in nonpublic schools at-
tended Catholic schools. Morgan, The Establishment Clause and Sectarian
Schools: A Final Installment9 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 57, 58. Another reason for re-
stricting the scope of this Note to nonpublic sectarian schools is suggested by
the following testimony of Professor Leo Pfeffer before the House Subcommit-
tee on Elementary, Secondary, and Vocational Education of the House Com-
mittee on Education and Labor.
[T]here is no constitutional barrier to governmental financing of pri-
vate schools that are not religious. But were the measures here under
consideration limited to secular preparatory schools, such as Eton and
Harrow, that cater exclusively to high-income families, it is doubtful
that we would be induced to introduce such a measure.
Oversight on Private Schools: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Elementary,
Secondary, & Vocational Education of the House Comm. on Education & La-
bor, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1981) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
2. For discussion of the persistent efforts of Washington state lawmakers,
see Note, Aid to Private Education" Persistent Lawmakers and the Court, 16
GONZAGA L. REV. 171, 178-80 (1980). For a discussion of these efforts in a heav-
ily Catholic state, see generally Note, State Aid to Rhode Island's Private
Schools: A Case Study of DiCenso v. Robinson, 22 CAm. LAw. 329 (1976).
3. See, e.g., L.& RE V. STAT. ANN. §§ 47:85-47:89 (West Supp. 1981-82); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 54A.3-1(b) (2) (West 1982) (ruled unconstitutional in Public Funds
for Pub. Schools v. Byrne, 590 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1979), affd mem., 442 U.S. 907
(1979)); N.Y. TAx LAw § 612(j) (McKinney 1975) (ruled unconstitutional in
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973)).
4. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 676 F.2d 1195, 1195 (8th Cir. 1982); Rhode Is-
land Fed'n of Teachers v. Norberg, 630 F.2d 855, 857 (1st Cir. 1980); Minnesota
Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer, 452 F. Supp. 1316, 1316 (D. Minn. 1978).
5. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (loans of instructional
aids and materials to parents and pupils attending nonpublic sectarian schools,
and transportation for field trips); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973) (tuition
reimbursement to parents with children attending nonpublic schools); Commit-
tee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (mainte-
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utes providing aid to sectarian schools or to children attending
such schools. 6 The Court's criteria for distinguishing between
permissible and impermissible state aid have been less than
clear, however.7 Despite the Court's professed use of a three
part test,8 reliable principles have been difficult to extract from
its school aid decisions.9
The latest chapter in the continuing controversy over state
aid to sectarian schools has arisen in the context of tax relief
for school-related expenses. Rhode Island and Minnesota en-
acted virtually identical laws providing tax benefits to parents
of children attending both public and nonpublic schools.O
nance and repair grants to nonpublic schools); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971) (direct payments to nonpublic school teachers in amounts up to 15% of
total salary for rendering educational services).
6. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444
U.S. 646 (1980) (direct reimbursement to sectarian schools for maintaining state
mandated attendance records and administering and grading state prepared
tests); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (provision of textbooks, standard-
ized testing and scoring services, on-premises diagnostic services, and off-prem-
ises therapeutic services); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (loans of
secular textbooks to nonpublic school children); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1 (1947) (provision of transportation of nonpublic school children to and
from school).
7. See infra notes 25-32 and accompanying text. One commentator has
observed that "[p]redicting the ultimate outcome of a school aid case is little
more than a guessing game." Hunter, The Continuing Debate over Tuition Tax
Credits, 7 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 523, 544 (1980).
8. See infra notes 33-56 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
10. Compare MNN. STAT. § 290.09(22) (1982), which provides a deduction
from gross income for
[t uition and transportation expense. The amount he has paid to
others, not to exceed $500 for each dependent in grades K to 6 and $700
for each dependent in grades 7 to 12, for tuition, textbooks and trans-
portation of each dependent in attending an elementary or secondary
school situated in Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa, or
Wisconsin, wherein a resident of this state may legally fulfill the state's
compulsory attendance laws, which is not operated for profit, and
which adheres to the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
chapter 363. As used in this subdivision, "textbooks" shall mean and
include books and other instructional materials and equipment used in
elementary and secondary schools in teaching only those subjects le-
gally and commonly taught in public elementary and secondary
schools in this state and shall not include instructional books and
materials used in the teaching of religious tenets, doctrines or worship,
nor shall it include such books or materials for, or transportation to, ex-
tracurricular activities including sporting events, musical or dramatic
events, speech activities, driver's education, or programs of a similar
nature.
with R. L GEN. LAws § 44-30-12(c) (2) (1980), which provides a deduction from
federal adjusted gross income for
(amounts) paid to others, not to exceed five hundred ($500) dollars for
each dependent in kindergarten through sixth grade and seven hun-
dred ($700) dollars for each dependent in grades seven through twelve
[Vol. 67:793
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Both statutes create deductions from gross income for tuition,
textbook, and transportation expenses of each dependent at-
tending any eligible" public or nonpublic elementary or secon-
dary school.12 Taxpayers' 3 in both states attacked the
constitutionality of the statutes, arguing that they violated the
establishment clause because they provided impermissible aid
to sectarian schools.' 4 The challenge succeeded in Rhode Is-
land when the First Circuit invalidated the tax relief in Rhode
Island Federation of Teachers v. Norberg.'5 The Minnesota tax
provision, however, was upheld-by the Eighth Circuit in Mueller
v. Allen.16 The United States Supreme Court has agreed to ad-
inclusive, for tuition, textbooks, and transportation of each dependent
attending an elementary or secondary school situated in Rhode Island,
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Vermont, New Hampshire, or Maine,
wherein a resident of this state may legally fulfill the state's compul-
sory attendance laws, which is not operated for profit, and which ad-
heres to the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. As used in this
section, "textbooks" shall mean and include books and other instruc-
tional materials and equipment used in elementary and secondary
schools in teaching only those subjects legally and commonly taught in
public elementary and secondary schools in this state and shall not in-
clude instructional books and materials used in the teaching of reli-
gious tenets, doctrines, or worship, the purpose of which is to inculcate
such tenets, doctrine or worship.
11. Both statutes provide three criteria for determining the eligibility of a
private elementary or secondary school The school must conform to the
state's compulsory education laws, it must not be operated for profit, and it
must adhere to the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. MiN. STAT.
§ 290.09(22) (1982); R. I. GEN. LAws § 44-30-12(c) (2) (1980).
12. MNt. STAT. § 290.09(22) (1982); R. I. GEN. LAws § 44-30-12(c) (2) (1980).
In both states, the deduction may not exceed $500 for each dependent in kin-
dergarten through sixth grade, and $700 for each dependent in grades seven
through twelve. MINN. STAT. § 290.09(22); R. L GEN. LAws § 44-30-12(c) (2).
13. In Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), the Supreme Court held that a
federal taxpayer has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a federal ex-
penditure of tax funds as violative of the establishment and free exercise
clauses. Id. at 101. Under the Flast doctrine, the taxpayers in the noted cases,
see infra note 14, apparently had standing to challenge the constitutionality of
a state law in federal court, although none of the courts directly addressed the
standing issue.
14. Mueller v. Allen, 676 F.2d 1195, 1995 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51
U.S.L.W. 3220 (Oct. 5, 1982); Rhode Island Fed'n of Teachers v. Norberg, 630 F.2d
855, 857 (1st Cir. 1980); Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer, 452 F. Supp.
1316, 1317 (D. Minn. 1978).
15. 630 F.2d at 861-62.
16. 676 F.2d at 1205. Before Mueller or Norberg, a three judge panel of the
Minnesota federal district court upheld the Minnesota law in Minnesota Civil
Liberties Union v. Roemer, 452 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Minn. 1978). Judge Devitt
wrote the majority opinion, joined by Circuit Judge Heaney. 452 F. Supp. at
1317-22. Judge Alsop dissented. 452 F. Supp. at 1322-24. The plaintiffs in that
case did not apply for certiorari to the Supreme Court, Comment, Constitu-
tional Law-First Amendment-Tax Deduction for Parents Sending Their Chil-
dren to Parochial School Does Not Violate the Establishment Clause-
Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer, 452 F. Supp. 1316, 28 DEPAUL L.
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dress this direct conflict between the circuits by granting certi-
orari in Mueller.17
This Note addresses the constitutionality18 of a statutory
scheme that provides deductions from gross income for tuition,
textbook, and transportation expenses to all parents with de-
pendents attending elementary and secondary19 schools. Part I
examines the Court's current approach to establishment clause
challenges to state aid to religious education. Part II presents
the responses of the First and Eighth Circuits to the attacks on
the constitutionality of the Rhode Island-Minnesota deduction
scheme. Part HI analyzes those responses in light of establish-
REv. 543, 551 (1979), because they lacked a strong evidentiary record of the per-
centage of benefiting taxpayers with children attending sectarian schools.
Speech by Linda Ojala, Staff Attorney of Minnesota Civil Liberties Union, Uni-
versity of Minnesota Law School Law Forum (Sept. 18, 1982).
17. See 51 U.S.L.W. 3220 (Oct. 5, 1982); see also 676 F.2d at 1201.
18. This Note will not address the policy questions surrounding tuition tax
relief, such as the relative wealth of the beneficiary class, the effect of the tax
relief on the public school system, the tendency of the aid to encourage "segre-
gation academies," and the relative budgetary expense of such a measure. Dis-
cussion of these and many other issues appears in House Hearings, supra note
1; Tuition Tax Relief Bills: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and
Debt Management Generally of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
19. The Supreme Court has allowed much more assistance to sectarian in-
stitutions of higher learning than to elementary and secondary sectarian
schools. Hunter, supra note 7, at 547. See, e.g., Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works,
426 U.S. 736, 767 (1976) (upholding direct grants, usable for any nonsectarian
purpose, to four church-affiliated colleges); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743-45
(1973) (upholding South Carolina statute authorizing issuance of revenue
bonds to help religious college finance reconstruction costs); Tilton v. Richard-
son, 403 U.S. 672, 688-89 (1971) (upholding construction grant to four church-af-
filiated colleges in Connecticut, but requiring a permanent ban on religious use
of the facilities). In distinguishing between aid to sectarian higher education
and elementary and secondary education, the Court has reasoned that older
students are less susceptible to religious influence and that institutions of
higher education are not as pervaded with religion as elementary and secon-
dary parochial schools. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 685-86. Several commentators have
attacked the empirical basis of the Court's distinction. See, e.g., 124 CoNG. REc.
25,809 (1978) (statement of Sen. Moynihan) (questioning whether high school
seniors are less impressionable than college freshmen); Fink, The Establish-
ment Clause According to the Supreme Court: The Mysterious Eclipse of Free
Exercise Values, 27 CATH. U. L. REv. 207, 237-40 (1978). Regardless of the accu-
racy of the Court's assumptions, the Court is likely to maintain its distinction
between aid to sectarian higher education and aid to sectarian elementary and
secondary education. Commentators predict that the Court would uphold the
constitutionality of tuition tax credits or deductions for parents with depen-
dents attending sectarian colleges or universities. See, e.g., Hunter, supra note
7, at 547. In fact, the Attorney General's office under President Carter wrote a
letter to Congress stating its opinion that, while tuition tax credits for sectarian
elementary and secondary education were unconstitutional, similar credits for
higher education were constitutionally proper. See 124 CONG. REc. 26,052-53
(1978) (memorandum from Attorney General's office).
[Vol. 67:793
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ment clause precedents and purposes. Finally, the Note sug-
gests a new approach to establishment clause challenges of tax
benefits in aid of religious institutions.
I. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE DOCTRINE AND STATE
AID TO RELIGIOUS EDUCATION
State aid to religious education was once widespread in the
United States, 20 and controversies over public assistance to
sectarian schools have erupted periodically at both the state
and federal levels since colonial times. 21 Nevertheless, the es-
tablishment clause provided few challenges to state and federal
legislation before World War H.22 In fact, the Court declined to
20. When the first amendment was adopted, nine of the thirteen states had
established churches. 124 CONG. REC. 25,662 (1978) (statement of Sen. Moyni-
han). Between 1770 and 1820, virtually all American schools were private, relig-
iously affiliated, and publicly supported. Id. at 25,631 (statement of Sen.
Packwood, quoting from memorandum prepared by Peter B. Sheridan, Library
of Congress). See also R. MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION 48
(1972) (before 1830, the only education available in America was private educa-
tion). The concept of massive state aid to education, or state provision of free
public education through "common" schools, however, was unknown in this
country until the public school movement of the 1830's and 1840's arose under
the leadership of figures like Horace Mann. Gabriel, Horace Mann: Report of
the Massachusetts Board of Education 1848, in AN AMERICAN PRIMER 360-61 (D.
Boorstin ed. 1966).
21. For example, an early Virginia controversy over taxation to support
Christian teachers provoked a strong response from James Madison, whose
"Remonstrance" has been widely cited in Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g.,
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 33-44 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
Another controversy ensued in the second half of the nineteenth century, when
President Grant proposed a constitutional amendment forbidding public aid to
sectarian schools. See 124 CONG. REc. 26,057 (1978) (reprinting Sen. Moynihan's
commencement address at LeMoyne College in New York). Another famous
case arising out of opposition to aid to religious education, and, indeed, the
very existence of religious education, concerned the Oregon law requiring all
pupils to attend public schools, which was ruled unconstitutional in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). This law was adopted after a referendum
campaign organized by the Ku Klux Klan and Scottish Rite Masons. D. KiRP &
M. YUDOF, EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 5 (1974).
See also 124 CONG. REc. 25,805 (1978) (statement of Sen. Moynihan). The
Supreme Court invalidated the law on substantive due process grounds. 268
U.S. at 534-35. For a general discussion of the nineteenth century struggle in
New York State over public support of sectarian schools, see J. PRATr, RELI-
GION, POLrrIcs, AND DIVERsrrY 195-203 (1967).
22. A brief discussion of the Supreme Court religion clause cases before
World War II appears in Morgan, supra note 1, at 58. Although the Court occa-
sionally dealt with religious issues before Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947), it never squarely faced the establishment clause question. In Cochran
v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930), the Court upheld public ex-
penditures to purchase school books and distribute them to all school children,
reasoning that the legislation aided the common interest, and did not benefit
only private schools or their students. In Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 81
19831
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apply the establishment clause to any state legislation until Ev-
erson v. Board of Education23 in 1947. In a 5-4 decision, the Ev-
erson Court upheld a New Jersey statute authorizing local
school districts to provide transportation to nonpublic as well
as public school pupils. 24
The sharp division in Everson foreshadowed the Court's in-
ability to forge a consensus in subsequent school aid cases. 25
By its own admission, the Court's articulation of establishment
clause doctrine in this area has lacked clarity and predictabil-
(1907), the Court upheld the Commissioner of Indian Affairs's payment of
funds to the Bureau of Catholic Indian Missions of Washington, D.C., reasoning
that the payment was made from funds belonging to the Indians, not to the
government. In Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 298-99 (1899), the Court up-
held a grant by the Commissioners of the District of Columbia to a hospital
managed by Catholics, for construction and care costs, reasoning that the grant
was made to a secular corporation, not to a Catholic entity or individuals. Al-
though each of these cases raised potential establishment clause questions, the
Court declined to address those questions.
The religion clauses were incorporated into the fourteenth amendment in
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 295, 303 (1939). This case involved an ordi-
nance requiring a public welfare council's prior approval of solicitation "for any
alleged religious, charitable or philanthropic cause." Id. at 301-02. Although the
Court's language broadly incorporated both religion clauses, the Court's invali-
dation of the ordinance actually rested on free exercise grounds. Id. at 307.
23. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
24. Id. at 3. The plaintiff in Everson specifically challenged a school board
resolution authorizing reimbursement for money spent by parents to send their
children to public schools and Catholic schools on public buses. Id. at 20 (Jack-
son, J., dissenting).
25. In school aid cases, the Court has divided into three groups. "Ac-
comodationists" would accommodate the legislature's will to aid parochial
schools. Justices in this group include White, Rehnquist, and, to a lesser de-
gree, Burger. G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONsTIrIoNAL LAW 1568
(10th ed. 1980). "Separationists" would maintain strict separation between
church and state. Justices in this group include Stevens, Brennan, Marshall,
and, formerly, Douglas. Id. The "swing voters" weigh the facts of each case.
Justices in this group have included Powell, Blackmun, and Stewart. Id. Jus-
tice O'Connor's predilections have yet to emerge.
One decision actually resulted in a 3-3-3 alignment, as various combina-
tions of justices voted to uphold the textbook loan provision of a challenged
statute, but voted to strike down two other provisions which would have per-
mitted the provision of instructional materials such as projectors and maps,
and auxiliary services. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 359-62, 362-66, 367-72
(1975). The Court's syllabus of the decision illustrates the division:
Stewart, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an
opinion of the Court, in which Blackmun and Powell, JJ., joined, and in
all but Part III of which Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., joined
... Brennan, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part, in which Douglas and Marshall, JJ., joined... Burger, C.J., filed
an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part
... Rehnquist, J., fied an opinion concurring in the judgment in part
and dissent in part, in which White, J., joined.
Id. at 350.
[Vol. 67:793
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ity.26 For example, according to the Supreme Court, a state
may furnish bus service for children attending a sectarian
school27 however, it may not furnish bus transportation for
those children to go on a field trip.2 8 A state may reimburse a
private school for the cost of maintaining state-mandated at-
tendance records,29 but may not reimburse such a school for
the cost of grading state-mandated, teacher-prepared tests. 30 A
state may provide secular textbooks for the use of children at-
tending sectarian private schools;31 yet it may not provide the
same children with "instructional materials," such as
projectors.32
A. THE CURRENT THREE PART TEST
Notwithstanding this unpredictability, the Court has devel-
oped and consistently professed to apply a three pronged test
to determine the constitutionality of school aid programs.33 To
withstand constitutional scrutiny, the challenged statute must
have a valid secular legislative purpose, must have a primary
effect which neither advances nor inhibits religion, and must
not foster excessive entanglement with religion.3 4
26. The Court's consistent divisions were acknowledged by Justice White
in the most recent elementary and secondary school aid case:
But Establishment Clause cases are not easy; they stir deep feelings;
and we are divided among ourselves, perhaps reflecting the different
views on this subject of the people of this country .... This course
sacrifices clarity and predictability for flexibility, but this promises to
be the case until the continuing interaction between the courts and the
States ... produces a single, more encompassing construction of the
Establishment Clause.
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980).
27. Everson, 330 U.S. at 17.
28. Wolman v. Waiter, 433 U.S. 229, 255 (1977).
29. Regan, 444 U.S. at 657.
30. Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 480
(1973).
31. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968).
32. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 362-66 (1975). "The Court has not yet
spoken with respect to maps in a textbook." House Hearings, supra note 1, at
48 (statement of Professor Antonin Scalia, Stanford Law School) (Professor
Scalia was recently appointed to the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals).
33. See, e.g., Regan, 444 U.S. at 653; Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
612-13 (1971).
34. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 612-13. The first two elements of this
test, purpose and primary effect, first appeared in Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963), a case involving state-required prayers in
public schools. The first application of the Schempp test in the context of aid to
sectarian schools came five years later in Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,
243-44 (1968), where the court upheld a New York law authorizing local
19831
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1. Secular Purpose
The secular purpose test focuses on the stated legislative
purpose of the challenged statute.35 Requiring a secular pur-
pose helps to ensure that no taxpayer is compelled to support a
church or religion through the state's sponsorship or financial
support of, or active involvement in, religion.36 This require-
ment is virtually always satisfied in school aid cases 37 because
state assistance to private schools "has the obvious legitimate
secular purpose of promoting educational opportunity."38
2. Primary Effect
To pass the primary effect test, the challenged statute must
have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits reli-
gion.39 When applied to the school aid cases, the primary effect
test prohibits state aid that subsidizes the religious mission of
sectarian schools.40 The Court will permit "neutral, nonideo-
logical" aid, such as police and fire protection, that serves a
school's secular function, even though the aid indirectly bene-
fits the school's religious mission by allowing the school to use
its budget to fund religious activities rather than secular ones. 41
The Court has unanimously invalidated aid, however, when the
state lacked effective means of ensuring that the aid would
fund only secular services. 42 In applying this "effective means"
standard, the Court has rejected the position that if the amount
of aid does not exceed the school's cost for secular educational
services, the state has successfully ensured that the aid will not
serve the school's religious mission.43 In addition to providing a
criterion for assessing primary effect, the "effective means"
educational agencies to loan textbooks to nonpublic schoolchildren. The exces-
sive entanglement test first appeared in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 676
(1970).
35. Nyquist 413 U.S. at 773.
36. Id. at 772.
37. See, e.g., id. at 773 ("[W]e need touch only briefly on the requirement
of a 'secular legislative purpose.' As the recitation of legislative purpose ap-
pended to New York's law indicates, each measure is adequately supported by
legitimate, nonsectarian state interests."); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613
(1971) ("[T]he statutes themselves clearly state that they are intended to en-
hance the quality of the secular education.").
38. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 43 n.5 (1980) (per curiam).
39. See, e.g., Nyquis4 413 U.S. at 773; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-
13 (1971).
40. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 779-80.
41. Id. at 775.
42. See Regan4 444 U.S. at 659; Nyquis4 413 U.S. at 774-80.
43. See Nyquist 414 U.S. at 787.
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standard connects the primary effect and excessive entangle-
ment prongs of the three part test. Aid which satisfies the pri-
mary effect test may be excessively entangling if ensuring that
the aid serves purely secular purposes would require "continu-
ing state surveillance." 44
When applying the primary effect test, the Court has not
distinguished between direct aid to nonpublic schools and aid
to nonpublic school children, their parents, or service provid-
ers. The Court generally has held that the direct beneficiary of
the aid is unimportant if the ultimate effect of the aid is to pro-
vide financial support for sectarian institutions or activities.45
Consequently, the Court will invalidate aid that does not di-
rectly benefit church schools if it finds that the aid rewards par-
ents for sending their children to such schools.46 On the other
hand, the Court has upheld direct state cash payments to
church schools if there are effective means, such as auditing
procedures, to ensure that the grants will be used only for sec-
ular services. 47 The constitutionality of state aid, therefore, de-
pends not upon whether church schools are the direct
recipients of the aid, but upon whether the state retains effec-
tive means to ensure that only the secular functions of those
schools are benefited.
3. Excessive Entanglement
For a statute to satisfy the excessive entanglement test, the
state must be able to ensure the secular use of the aid without
creating enduring and entangling contacts between state and
church.46 The Court has recognized two types of excessive en-
tanglement: administrative and political. Administrative en-
tanglement results from "comprehensive, discriminating, and
continuing state surveillance" 49 of religious affairs to ensure
that the contemplated aid remains strictly secular in nature.5 0
Political entanglement results from repeated confrontation
44. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 619. See also infra notes 48-56 and ac-
companying text.
45. See, e.g., Nyquis. 413 U.S. at 783.
46. Id. at 791.
47. Regan, 444 U.S. at 659.
48. See, e.g., Meek, 421 U.S. at 372.
49. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 619.
50. Examples include monitoring auxiliary services personnel to ensure
religious neutrality while working on nonpublic school grounds, Meek 421 U.S.
at 372; monitoring teachers to ensure their religious neutrality in the classroom,
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619; and tax valuation, tax liens, and tax foreclosure arising
from taxation of church property, Walz 397 U.S. at 674.
1983]
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among sects competing for public funds in the political arena.51
The excessive entanglement test guards against the latent dan-
gers of government hostility toward religion 2 that arise when
government expands its involvement with religion.5 3
Under this test, a state may not provide aid if officials
would have to monitor nonpublic school personnel closely to
ensure secular use of the aid.54 Nevertheless, the Court re-
cently held in Committee for Public Education and Religious
Liberty v. Regan that state auditing of church school expense
accounts to verify the school's cost of rendering reimbursable
services does not constitute excessive entanglement.5  Justice
White, writing for the majority, reasoned that the reimbursable
services, test scoring and attendance taking, were "discrete and
clearly identifiable" and that the reimbursement process was
"straightforward and susceptible to the routinization that char-
acterizes most reimbursement schemes."5 6 Thus, the Court ap-
parently will tolerate some degree of continuing state
involvement with church schools, as long as the involvement
51. Examples include the recurrent nature of the appropriations process
for renewal of an auxiliary services program, Meek, 412 U.S. at 372; the self-per-
petuating tendencies of tuition grant and credit programs and maintenance and
repair provisions, Nyquist 413 U.S. at 797; and the recurrent nature of continu-
ing annual appropriations for, and likely demand for expansion of, teacher sal-
ary supplements, Lemon, 403 U.S. at 623. For a criticism of the "political
entanglement" theory, see Gaffney, Political Divisiveness Along Religious
Lines: The Entanglement of the Court in Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy,
24 ST. L. U. L. J. 205, 206 (1980) ("political divisiveness" test entails unaccept-
able consequences for civil liberties).
52. See Walz 397 U.S. at 673.
53. See id. at 674. Aid programs invalidated under the excessive entangle-
ments test include "auxiliary services" conducted on nonpublic school prem-
ises including guidance, counseling, and testing services, psychological
services, services for exceptional children, and services for educationally disad-
vantaged children, Meek, 421 U.S. at 367-72; and direct payments to nonpublic
school teachers in amounts up to 15% of total salary for educational services
rendered, Lemon 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
54. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. at 254 (invalidating provision of Ohio law
allowing public funds to be used for transporting sectarian school students on
field trips under supervision of nonpublic school teachers). The Court's action
in upholding state loans of textbooks to nonpublic school children in Board of
Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), suggested that a state may provide aid to
schools if the state can determine that the aid is secular in nature through one
inspection before the aid is distributed. See id. at 254-55. Subsequently, how-
ever, the Court invalidated state loans of periodicals, maps, charts, and films to
nonpublic schools or to nonpublic school children, Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
at 354-55, even though the Court acknowledged that such materials were "secu-
lar, nonideological and neutral." Id. at 365. The Court has thus explicitly de-
clined to extend Allen to items other than textbooks. See Wolman, 433 U.S. at
252 n.18; infra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
55. Regan, 444 U.S. at 659-60.
56. Id. at 660.
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does not require state inspection and evaluation of the reli-
gious content of particular educational services.
B. TEXTBOOKS AND INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS
An analysis of the conflict between the First Circuit's rul-
ing in Norberg57 and that of the Eighth Circuit in Mueller58 re-
quires familiarity with several leading Supreme Court cases, as
well as with the Court's three pronged mode of analysis dis-
cussed above.5 9 Board of Education v. Allen60 provides the
most important precedent regarding the textbook deduction
provision of the challenged statutory schemes. 61 In Allen, the
Court upheld a New York law authorizing local educational
agencies to loan textbooks to nonpublic school children.62 Jus-
tice White, writing for the majority, reasoned that the text-
books, prescreened by public school authorities, were secular
in nature,63 and rejected the argument that church schools are
so pervaded by religion that any aid to their educational func-
tion necessarily aids their religious mission.6 4
Although Allen announced the principle that the nature
and effect of state aid will be presumed to be neutral unless
those challenging the aid can show otherwise, 65 the Court sub-
sequently has declined to extend this presumption of neutrality
to items other than textbooks.66 In Meek v. Pittenger,67 the
Court invalidated loans of "instructional materials" to nonpub-
lic schools.6 8 Reversing the logic of Allen, the Court reasoned
that the program benefited church schools that provided an in-
tegrated secular and religious education.69 Consequently, the
"massive" loans of materials would inevitably help those
schools advance their religious missions.70 The Court subse-
57. 630 F.2d 855 (1st Cir. 1980). t
58. 676 F.2d 1195 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.LW. 3220 (Oct. 5,
1982).
59. See supra notes 33-56 and accompanying text.
60. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
61. See supra note 10 for the statutory language authorizing the textbook
deduction provision.
62. 392 U.S. at 243-44.
63. Id at 244-45.
64. Id. at 245.
65. See id. at 248. See also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. at 252 n.18.
66. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 252 n.18.
67. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
68. These materials could include periodicals, photographs, maps, charts,
sound recordings, films, projection equipment, recording equipment, and labo-
ratory equipment. Id. at 354-55.
69. Id. at 366.
70. Id.
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quently invalidated an Ohio statute authorizing state loans of
instructional materials to pupils on the ground that those
materials would have the same effect as items provided directly
to the school.71 In a footnote, the Court noted the "tension" be-
tween its holding and the result in Allen and explicitly declined
to extend Allen to items other than textbooks.72
C. TAX BENEFITS AND RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS
The two cases most relevant to the tuition deduction provi-
sion challenged in Norberg and Mueller73 are Walz v. Tax Com-
mission74 and Committee for Public Education and Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 75 both of which addressed the constitution-
ality of tax relief which aided religious institutions. In Walz,
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the New
York City Tax Commission's grant of a property tax exemption
to religious organizations for property used solely for religious
worship.7 6 The Court conceded that granting tax exemptions
afforded churches an indirect economic benefit and gave rise to
some state involvement in church affairs.7 7 The benefit did not
amount to sponsorship, however, because the government did
not transfer funds to churches, but merely abstained from tax-
ing them, just as it abstained from taxing libraries, art galleries,
and hospitals.7 8 Moreover, the state involvement caused by tax
exemption was "minimal and remote,"79 while taxation of
churches would give rise to greater entanglement in the form of
"tax valuation of church property, tax liens, tax foreclosures,
and the direct confrontations and conflicts that follow in the
train of those legal processes."80 These considerations, coupled
with the longstanding and widespread historical acceptance of
tax exemptions for churches,81 convinced the Court that federal
or state grants of tax exemption to churches do not violate the
establishment clause.8 2
71. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 255.
72. Id. at 252 n.18.
73. See supra note 10 for the statutory language authorizing the tuition de-
duction provision.
74. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
75. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
76. 397 U.S. at 666-67.
77. Id. at 674-75.
78. Id. at 675.
79. Id. at 676.
80. Id. at 674.
81. Id. at 676-78.
82. Id. at 680.
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The Nyquist decision invalidated a New York law which
provided parents of nonpublic school children with a tuition re-
imbursement if their income was less than $5000,83 or with a tu-
ition deduction if their income exceeded that amount.84 The
Court held that both provisions violated the primary effect
test.8 5 The ultimate effect of the tuition reimbursement was
"unmistakably to provide financial support for nonpublic sec-
tarian institutions," because it provided a financial incentive for
parents to send their children to sectarian schools 86 and en-
sured their financial ability to do s0.87 The Court also struck
down the tax deduction,88 reasoning that it too rewarded par-
ents for sending their children to nonpublic schools.89 The
Court noted that the deduction was like a tax credit, since it
yielded a fixed amount of "tax forgiveness" in exchange for per-
forming an act which the state desired to encourage.90 The
Court therefore reserved decision on the constitutionality of a
"genuine tax deduction."9 1
83. 413 U.S. at 764-65.
84. Id. at 765-66.
85. Id. at 783, 789-94.
86. Id. at 786.
87. Id. at 783.
88. Id. at 789-94.
89. Id. at 791.
90. Id. at 789. Under the state tax deduction provision, parents could sub-
tract from their adjusted gross income a designated amount for each dependent
for whom they had paid at least $50 in nonpublic school tuition. The designated
amount decreased as the taxpayer's income increased. Id. at 765.
91. Id. at 790 n.49. This footnote has become important in the litigation
arising out of the Minnesota and Rhode Island textbook and tuition deduction
statutes. The Eighth Circuit distinguished the Minnesota and Rhode Island
schemes from Nyquist on the ground that the Minnesota provision operates as
a "true tax deduction." 676 F.2d at 1203. Several Supreme Court decisions
since Nyquis; however, suggest that the distinction between tax credits and
"genuine" deductions does not have the constitutional weight Nyquist sug-
gested. The Supreme Court has summarily affirmed and denied certiorari to
lower court decisions invalidating state income tax credits for parents of chil-
dren in kindergarten, elementary, and secondary nonpublic schools. See
Franchise Tax Bd. v. United Americans for Pub. Schools, 419 U.S. 890 (1974)
(summarily affirming unreported decision by a California district court); Min-
nesota Civil Liberties Union v. State, 302 Minn. 216, 233, 224 N.W.2d 344, 353
(1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 988 (1975). The Supreme Court also summarily af-
firmed a decision by an Ohio district court invalidating an Ohio state tax credit
for nonpublic school parents that provided a dollar-for-dollar offset of the tax-
payer's liability under state income and property taxes, up to $90 per pupil. See
Kosydar v. Wolman, 353 F. Supp. 744, 766 (S.D. Ohio 1972), affd sub nom. Grit v.
Wolman, 413 U.S. 901 (1973). Finally, the Court has summarily affirmed a Third
Circuit decision invalidating a New Jersey tuition tax deduction which oper-
ated as a $1000 tax exemption for each dependent child attending on a full time
basis an elementary or secondary institution not deriving its primary support
from public moneys. See Public Funds for Pub. Schools v. Byrne, 590 F.2d 514,
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The Nyquist majority distinguished the property tax ex-
emption for religious property upheld in Walz. 92 While prop-
erty tax exemptions like the one in Walz had enjoyed
longstanding and widespread historical acceptance, the New
York tax benefits were comparatively recent.93 More impor-
tant, the Court maintained that the exemptions helped guard
religions from state hostility and thus fostered governmental
neutrality toward religion, while the tax credits would have in-
creased governmental involvement in religion and might have
adversely affected neutrality.94 Finally, the beneficiary class of
charitable institutions in Walz was broader and included more
secular interests than the beneficiary class of nonpublic school
parents in Nyquist, thus reducing the chance that the govern-
mental aid in Walz would provoke political strife along sectar-
ian lines.95
II. THE NORBERG AND MUELLER DECISIONS
Given the lack of clarity and predictability in the Court's
approach to school aid cases 96 and the persistent efforts of
state legislatures to find new ways to channel aid to nonpublic
schoolg, 97 the direct conflict between the First and Eighth Cir-
cuits concerning the constitutionality of the Rhode Island and
Minnesota tuition tax deduction schemes is not surprising.
This Part describes how the Norberg and Mueller courts rea-
soned from Supreme Court precedents to reach opposite con-
clusions concerning the validity of virtually identical statutes.98
516 (3d Cir.), affid mem., 442 U.S. 907 (1979). For a detailed discussion of the
effect of these decisions on the "true tax deduction" issue, see infra notes 152-
53 and accompanying text.
92. Nyquis 413 U.S. at 792-94.
93. Id. at 792.
94. Id. at 793.
95. Id. at 794.
96. See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 2.
98. Neither the First nor the Eighth Circuit held that the transportation
deduction provision failed to satisfy the Supreme Court's three pronged test.
See Norberg, 630 F.2d at 862; Mueller, 676 F.2d at 1201. The Mueller court, ob-
serving that "no one seriously challenges the transportation deduction," noted
that Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), approved financed transporta-
tion to and from all schools, including sectarian schools. 676 F.2d at 1201. The
Eighth Circuit reasoned that an indirect tax deduction for all Minnesota par-
ents must also be permissible. Id. at 1201. As in Everson, the court noted, the
financial benefits flowing from the Minnesota statute were directed to all par-
ents in the community. Id.
Although the First Circuit invalidated the transportation deduction provi-
sion of the Rhode Island statute in Norberg, the court's action merely upheld
the district court's conclusion that the transportation deduction constituted a
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A. THE TEXTBOOK AND INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS DEDUCTION
The First Circuit invalidated the textbook and instructional
materials deduction under the excessive entanglement test.99
The court approved the district court's reasoning that, because
the statute allowed parents to decide for themselves which
books and materials were secular and therefore eligible for the
deduction, only continuing state surveillance could ensure that
parents did not receive deductions for religiously oriented
books and materials.100 Since schools rather than parents usu-
ally choose curriculum materials, any dispute over the religious
nature of those materials eventually would have to be resolved
between the state and the religious institutions.O' The court
therefore concluded that surveillance of parents' claimed de-
ductions would ultimately result in excessive entanglement be-
tween the state and religious institutions.10 2
The court rejected the state's argument that instructional
materials that originally are secular will not change in use,103
noting that an existing Rhode Island statute required local
school committees to lend secular textbooks to all Rhode Is-
land children. 0 4 The court found that the prior existence of
minor part of the statute and therefore could not be severed from the unconsti-
tutional portions of the statute. 630 F.2d at 862. The First Circuit reasoned that
the legislature had included all three deductions in the same sentence, that all
three provisions had the same purpose, and that the existence of previous state
requirements that local school boards provide free transportation to all primary
and secondary students in Rhode Island suggested that the transportation pro-
vision was only a minor aspect of the entire bill. Id. at 863. Judge Campbell
dissented from the majority's disposition of the transportation deduction, stat-
ing that he was not persuaded that the court had correctly interpreted the will
of the legislature in concluding that the transportation deduction was only a
minor portion of the statute. Id. at 863 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
The Minnesota Federal District Court had previously upheld the transpor-
tation deduction provision in Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer, 452 F.
Supp. 1316, 1319 (D. Minn. 1978). The district court reasoned that the Supreme
Court had previously permitted states to provide transportation directly to pa-
rochial schools and students. Id. at 1319. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 16. Hence,
the court concluded that an indirect subsidy for the same items must be valid a
fortiori. 452 F. Supp. at 1318.
99. 630 F.2d at 861-62.
100. Id. at 862.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. The Supreme Court's decisions in Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349
(1975), and Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), had expressly forbidden
loans of materials and equipment such as film projectors and teaching aids be-
cause of the potential administrative entanglement involved in ensuring that
the materials were not used to promote the school's religious mission. See
supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
104. 630 F.2d at 862.
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this statute gave the new deduction "a sectarian hue,"105 imply-
ing that because the government already provided secular text-
books to private schools free of charge, the only books the
parents would claim deductions for would be sectarian. The
court did not, however, explain the relationship between the
pre-existing Rhode Island textbook loan statute and the pro-
posed deduction for instructional materials. 0 6
The Eighth Circuit, on the other hand, upheld the textbook
and instructional materials deduction provision. Apparently
addressing the primary effect issue, the court concluded that
the textbook deduction fell within the constitutional protection
of Board of Education v. Allen,107 which had upheld state pro-
vision of textbooks to nonpublic school children. 108 With re-
gard to instrictional materials, the Eighth Circuit
acknowledged that previous Supreme Court cases had invali-
dated loans of instructional materials and equipment directly
to sectarian schools,109 but distinguished those cases on the
ground that the Minnesota law directed its benefits to the par-
ent and student, not to the school.lO The nature of the benefici-
ary was a constitutionally significant factor,' the court noted,
because instructional equipment needed by a school would
often be equally useful for both secular and religious training,
whereas items such as rulers and tennis shoes, which a student
would be likely to purchase, would not." 2
Relying on the district court's reasoning, the Eighth Circuit
also held that the textbook and instructional materials deduc-
tions satisfied the excessive entanglement test." 3 The district
court had acknowledged that some textbook and materials de-
ductions might require examination." 4 Nevertheless, the lower
court had held that the entanglement would be "minimal," not-
ing that the primary method of surveillance would be an indi-
vidual audit." 5
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
108. 676 F.2d at 1201.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1201-02.
111. Id. at 1202.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. 514 F. Supp. at 1003.
115. Id. The district court had previously upheld the textbook deduction in
Roemer. 452 F. Supp. at 1319. The court reasoned that since the Supreme
Court had previously permitted states to provide textbooks directly to paro-
chial schools and students, see Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968),
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B. THE TUITION DEDUCTION
The First Circuit held that the tuition deduction violated
the primary effect test.1 16 The court noted that neither the
form of the aid nor the nature of the beneficiaries was constitu-
tionally significant. Citing Nyquist, the court reasoned that if
an indirect subsidy for textbooks would be valid a fortiori. 452 F. Supp. at 1318-
19.
116. 630 F.2d at 858-61. In Roemer, the Minnesota Federal District Court's
opinion was primarily devoted to analysis of the tuition deduction provision
under the primary effect test. See 452 F. Supp. at 1319-22. The court acknowl-
edged that the statute was facially neutral toward religion, but stated that fur-
ther inquiry was necessary to determine whether the tuition deduction
primarily advanced the religious function of affected parochial schools. Id. at
1320. Because the court could find "no discernible consistency" in Supreme
Court doctrinal analysis, the court concentrated on "the two most relevant
cases," Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), and Committee for Pub. Educ.
& Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). Id. These cases were rele-
vant, the court reasoned, because they were the only two Supreme Court deci-
sions addressing the establishment clause ramifications of tax benefits to
religious organizations. Id.
The court listed three factors which distinguished the permissible tax ex-
emption in Walz from the impermissible tax deduction in Nyquist: the degree
to which the tax benefit aided the sectarian institution; the breadth of the class
benefiting from the tax relief; and the historical acceptance of the tax benefit to
religious activity. Id. The court concluded that all three factors favored distin-
guishing the questioned Minnesota law from the New York statute invalidated
in Nyquist.
First, the court found that the Minnesota law functioned as a "true tax de-
duction," and that Nyquist had expressly reserved decision on the constitution-
ality of a true tax deduction. Id. at 1321. See supra notes 91-95 and
accompanying text. The court envisioned a "spectrum" of "directness" of aid to
religious institutions. Aid in the form of subsidies and grants was "direct" and
therefore impermissible, but aid in the form of exemptions was "remote" and
therefore permissible. 452 F. Supp. at 1321-22. A "true tax deduction" lay some-
where between these two extremes. Id. The court reasoned that the Minne-
sota statutory scheme reduced the tax base rather than directly reducing the
amount of tax due. Id. Parents with children attending parochial schools
would benefit only if the deduction caused them to be in a lower bracket. Id.
The resultant relationship between tax benefit and religious activity was much
more remote than the tax credit system previously invalidated by the Supreme
Court. Id. at 1321-22.
The court then noted that the class of beneficiaries under the questioned
statute was wider than that involved in Nyquist; for the Minnesota law ex-
tended its benefits to parents of public elementary or secondary school stu-
dents with dependents attending nonpublic schools. Id. at 1322. The court also
maintained that since the law had been unchallenged since its enactment in
1955, the historical acceptance of the tax benefit militated in favor of its contin-
uation. Id. The court likened the law to the widely accepted tax deduction for
contributions to charitable institutions, including religious organizations. Id.
Besides its historical acceptance, the tuition deduction, like the exemption al-
lowed in Waz supported the valid legislative goal of avoiding hostility to reli-
gion through taxation. Id. Because of the lack of direct benefit to religious
activity, the breadth of the beneficiary, and the historical acceptance of the tax
deduction, the court concluded that the Minnesota law did not have the pri-
mary effect of advancing religion. Id.
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the deductions conferred a special benefit on parents who sent
their children to religious schools, the statute violated the es-
tablishment clause because it rewarded performance of a reli-
gious act."l7 Whether the religious schools received any direct
benefit as a result of the tax relief was irrelevant.118 The court
also noted that a variety of tax credits and deductions for par-
ents of parochial school children have been invalidated on es-
tablishment clause grounds.119 Consequently, the court
reasoned, aid to religious education in the form of tax benefits
to parents is not constitutionally superior to direct grants.120
The First Circuit concluded that the factor controlling the
constitutionality of tax aid to religious institutions and religious
education was the breadth of the benefited class. 121 In support
of its conclusion, the court noted that such tax relief has been
upheld only when the affected religious organizations were part
of a broader class of beneficiaries.122 The district court had
found that the vast majority of parents eligible for the tax de-
duction sent their children to sectarian schools.123 Because the
Rhode Island income tax is based on a percentage of the tax-
payer's federal income tax, any parent eligible for the deduc-
tion who also owed federal tax would benefit.124 Since most
parents are likely to pay federal income tax, the First Circuit
concluded that the statute conferred a benefit "along nearly
solid sectarian lines."'125 Consequently, the court distinguished
the Rhode Island tax benefits scheme from the broad class of
beneficiaries upheld in Walz and invalidated the statute under
Nyquist.
In contrast, the Eighth Circuit upheld the tuition deduction
under the primary effect test, distinguishing the New York law
invalidated in Nyquist on two grounds. First, the Minnesota
scheme, unlike the law in Nyquist, provided a "true" deduc-
tion.126 Because the tax benefit in Nyquist was not related to
the amount actually spent on tuition, it operated as a tax credit
117. 630 F.2d at 858.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 860-61. See also supra note 91.
120. 630 F.2d at 860.
121. Id. at 861.
122. Id. See, e.g., Walz, 397 U.S. at 673. See also supra text accompanying
notes 76-82.
123. 630 F.2d at 859-60 (quoting Norberg, 479 F. Supp. at 1366).
124. 630 F.2d at 860.
125. Id.
126. Mueller, 676 F.2d at 1203. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
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rather than a deduction, 2 7 and the Nyquist Court had specifi-
cally declined to decide whether a "genuine tax deduction"
would be constitutional.128 The Minnesota deduction, however,
varied with the tuition paid. Moreover, the deduction yielded
no tax benefit unless it was large enough to move the taxpayer
into a lower bracket.129 The court concluded that the Minnesota
tax benefit to the school was "more diffused and less certain"
than the aid in Nyquist, 3 O but did not clarify whether this dif-
ference alone would dispose of the primary effect issue.
The Eighth Circuit also distinguished Nyquist on the basis
of the breadth of the benefited class. The New York law limited
tax benefits to parents of private school children, but the Min-
nesota scheme covered tuition paying parents with dependents
in public or private schools.131 Although this distinction ap-
pears to depend on a facial, or "de jure," analysis of the
breadth of the benefited class, the court explicitly rejected both
a strict de jure and a pure de facto approach.132 While the
127. 676 F.2d at 1203.
128. Id. See Nyquist 413 U.S. at 790 nA9. See also supra note 91 and accom-
panying text.
129. 676 F.2d at 1197. The court's language follows the conclusion of the dis-
trict court: "The deductions are subtracted from gross income and thus reduce
the tax base. They result in a tax benefit only if the deduction moves the tax-
payer into a lower bracket" Mueller v. Allen, 514 F. Supp. 998, 1000 (D. Minn.
1981). This statement, however, is imprecise. Minnesota "gross income" con-
sists of federal adjusted gross income, with various modifications increasing or
decreasing that amount. See MmN. STAT. § 290.01(20) (1982). The contested
provision allows a deduction from "gross income." See MON. STAT. § 290.09 (22)
(1982). This deduction thus affords a tax benefit to any parent meeting the re-
quirements of subdivision 22. See supra note 10. The court's conclusion that
the deduction yields no tax benefit unless it moves the taxpayer into a lower
bracket apparently refers to the Minnesota standard deduction. See MINN.
STAT. § 290.09(15) (1982). This provision allows the taxpayer to deduct an
amount equal to 10% of adjusted gross income, up to a maximum deduction of
$2,000, in lieu of the tuition deduction and other deductions under MmINN. STAT.
§ 290.09. Hence, an individual taxpayer probably would not claim the tuition
deduction unless the amount of the deduction, together with the taxpayer's
other allowable deductions from gross income, exceeded the taxpayer's stan-
dard deduction under MwN. STAT. § 290.09(15).
130. 676 F.2d at 1197.
131. Id. at 1203.
132. Id. at 1201 n.13.
If a strict de jure analysis were advocated, one would be inviting legis-
latures to enact facially neutral statutes which could operate as mere
sham. If a pure de facto approach were taken, a statute's constitution-
ality might turn on local annual statistics. That is, the same statute
might be constitutional one year, and not the next, or in one state and
not in another, depending upon the current statistical breakdown of
sectarian and nonsectarian schools. Nothing so rigid or so arbitrary
can be gleaned from precedent in this area.
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court never explained what approach it adopted, Mueller can
plausibly be read to stand for the proposition that a court must
weigh the degree of arbitrariness of the tax benefit, the breadth
of the de jure class, and the breadth of the de facto class in ap-
plying the primary effect test to tax benefit cases. The less ar-
bitrary the tax benefits and the more general the de jure class,
the narrower the de facto class can be without invalidating the
statute. This reading is supported by the court's reaction to
statistics. The court found that fourteen to eighteen percent of
the eligible taxpayers were parents of nonsectarian private
school children and that public school parents would qualify
collectively for over two million dollars in deductions.133 Em-
phasizing the breadth of the de jure class, the court concluded
that the de facto class was sufficiently broad for the statute to
stand.l3 4
IM ANALYSIS OF THE COURTS' APPROACHES
The Norberg and Mueller decisions present three basic is-
sues: whether the tax deduction for books and instructional
materials violates the excessive entanglement test; whether the
tuition deduction functions as a "true tax deduction" and if so,
whether it is constitutional; and whether broadening the bene-
ficiary class to include public school parents as well as nonpub-
lic school parents renders the challenged statutory scheme
constitutional.
A. EXCESSIVE ENTANGLEMENT AND THE DEDUCTION FOR
TEXTBOOKS AND INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS
The First Circuit correctly concluded that the statutory de-
duction for textbooks and instructional materials violated the
establishment clause of the first amendment. Enforcement of
133. Id. at 1204.
134. Id. at 1205. In Roemer, Judge Alsop dissented from the majority's dis-
position of the tuition deduction provision under the primary effect test. 452 F.
Supp. at 1321. He reasoned that the number of taxpayers actually affected by
the extension of the deduction to tuition paying public school parents was so
limited as to broaden the scope "only imperceptibly" beyond previously imper-
missible provisions. Id. at 1323 (Alsop, J., dissenting). Since the Minnesota de-
duction provided no less of a subsidy to the sectarian activities of the school
than did the statute invalidated in Nyquisl Judge Alsop concluded that the re-
lationship between tax relief and taxpayers' actual expenditures was "without
constitutional significance." Id. at 1324 (Alsop, J., dissenting). Finally, the Min-
nesota deduction's twenty-five year history was far too short to connote univer-
sal historical acceptance. Id. (Alsop, J., dissenting). Hence, Judge Alsop
would have held that the statute had the impermissible primary effect of ad-
vancing religion. Id. (Alsop, J., dissenting).
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the restriction against religiously oriented books would require
continuing state surveillance, and such a monitoring system
eventually would result in church-state entanglement because
school administrators, not parents, devise the curriculum.
Controversies would arise when private schools selected text-
books that were not clearly secular in content and private
school parents subsequently claimed deductions for those text-
books.135 A controversy between a parent and the government
regarding the secular nature of a particular book would quickly
become a dispute between the state and the sectarian school
administration that selected the book. State courts and admin-
istrators would have to draw increasingly fine distinctions be-
tween "secular" and "religious" subject matter. 3 6 The
excessive entanglement requirement exists to prevent exactly
this type of controversy from arising.137 The Eighth Circuit
completely ignored this problem, relying on the Supreme
Court's approval of textbook loans to nonpublic school children
in Allen.138 The loan programs in Allen, however, allowed the
state to preselect and prescreen textbooks to ensure their secu-
lar nature,139 thereby obviating the need for continued surveil-
lance. In contrast, the Rhode Island and Minnesota schemes
afford the state no opportunity to prescreen textbooks.
In addition, the textbook provision might pressure private
135. "Scientific creationist" biology textbooks provide an example of a po-
tential controversy concerning religious content of secular textbooks. Recently,
a federal district court in Arkansas ruled that a state cannot require public
school biology teachers to teach the "scientific creationist" theory of human de-
velopment as well as "Darwinian evolution," on the ground that "scientific crea-
tionism" constitutes a religion, not a science. See McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of
Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1264-66 (E.D. Ark. 1982). This ruling, however, does not
affect the rights of nonpublic school administrators and educators to choose
these books in their own biology classrooms. In fact, one of the major attrac-
tions of nonpublic sectarian schools is their ability to operate without the re-
strictions public schools face. Given this freedom, and the strong public
demand for such textbooks, evidenced by the passage of the Arkansas law in-
validated in McLean, nonpublic sectarian schools will inevitably use some
books to teach secular subjects which are not obviously "secular" in nature.
136. See supra note 135. One can reasonably anticipate controversies
which, like McLean, force an administrative or judicial body to determine
whether the subject matter and approach of a given textbook tends to promote
secular education or religious training.
137. Cf. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (eschewing tax valua-
tion of church property because of the "direct confrontations and conflicts that
follow in the train of... legal processes"). See supra text accompanying notes
76-82. Under Walz, the textbook deduction provision fails because of its poten-
tial to cause excessive entanglement between church and state.
138. 676 F.2d at 1201. See also supra text accompanying notes 107-08.
139. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1968). See alo supra text
accompanying notes 63-64.
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school administrators to choose more neutral, "secular" books
than they would ordinarily select, to ensure parents' ability to
qualify for deductions.140 This subtle coercion would threaten
the uniqueness and diversity private schools bring to American
education,141 the very qualities proponents of public aid to pri-
vate schools wish to preserve. 4 2
On the instructional materials issue, the Eighth Circuit
concluded that items such as tennis shoes, purchased by a stu-
dent for classroom use, present little danger of aiding religion
and therefore are constitutionally distinguishable from materi-
als such as maps and film projectors, purchased by an institu-
tion, which are equally useful in both secular and religious
training.143 If this argument were correct, the instructional
materials deduction would not necessitate continuing state sur-
veillance. The breadth of the term "instructional materials,"
however, undercuts the reasoning in Mueller. The Eighth Cir-
cuit read the statute to allow deductions only for materials that
could be provided to students on an individual basis, yet noth-
ing on the face of the statute justifies this assumption. 44 For
example, a sectarian school could add a "user's fee" to tuition
for the use of maps, projectors, and cassette tapes. Since the
parents would pay this user's fee for instructional materials,
under the present statutory definition they could deduct the fee
from their gross income. Through this two-step process, the
state could subsidize sectarian schools' use of instructional
materials, a result clearly in conflict with previous Supreme
Court holdings.145
140. Cf. Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 775 (1976) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) ("I would add emphasis to the pernicious tendency of a
state subsidy to tempt religious schools to compromise their religious mission
without wholly abandoning it.").
141. See infra text accompanying notes 184-85.
142. See H.R. 12050, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 25,378 (1978) (Sen-
ate tuition tax credit bill passed by Senate, but only after amendment had re-
moved credits for elementary and secondary school parents, leaving only
credits for parents with dependents in institutions of higher education).
143. 676 F.2d at 1202. See also supra text accompanying notes 109-12.
144. See supra note 10. Note that the Minnesota statute includes "instruc-
tional materials" in its definition of "textbooks," yet never defines "instruc-
tional materials." See Mn . STAT. § 290.09(22) (1982). The statute subsequently
excludes "instructional books and materials" used for the teaching of religion,
and "such books and materials" for extracurricular activities. See id. The stat-
ute, however, is silent as to whether "instructional materials" can include
maps, film projectors, and cassette tapes, which the Supreme Court has previ-
ously held cannot be directly supplied to sectarian nonpublic schools, see Meek,
421 U.S. at 362-66, or to students, see Wolman, 433 U.S. at 252.
145. The instructional materials deduction may also violate the primary ef-
fect test. The Supreme Court has held that loans of instructional materials to
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B. THE 'TRUE TAX DEDUCTION" TEST
In Nyquis the Supreme Court characterized the chal-
lenged tax benefit as a cross between a tax credit and a deduc-
tion.146 The Court expressly reserved the question of the
validity of a "genuine tax deduction" which benefited religion,
such as the deduction for charitable contributions. 47 The
Court's discussion, however, did not make clear what distin-
guishes a tax credit from a "genuine" deduction or how impor-
tant this difference is in deciding establishment clause
questions.
On the one hand, the Nyquist Court emphasized the arbi-
trariness of the challenged tax benefit. In the course of invali-
dating the law under the primary effect test, the Court noted
that parents of children attending nonpublic schools were able
to decrease their adjusted gross income by an amount unre-
lated to the amount actually spent on tuition.148 Thus, Nyquist
could be read as holding that tax benefits which are arbitrary in
this way are more suspect under the primary effect test than
those which are not. The Court's characterization of charitable
deductions as "genuine" supports this reading of Nyquist.
Charitable deductions, unlike the tax benefits invalidated in
Nyquist, are based on actual expenditures. 49 If this distinc-
tion between arbitrary tax benefits and "true" deductions is
constitutionally significant, the Mueller court was correct in dis-
tinguishing the Minnesota deduction scheme, in which the tax
benefit depends on the amount of tuition paid.
In contrast, the Nyquist Court's focus on the nature of the
New York tax benefit as a subsidy undercuts its apparent em-
phasis on the distinction between arbitrary benefits and true
deductions. At one point, the Court characterized tax credits
as benefits designed to encourage specific acts, and it invali-
dated the New York law on the ground that the tax benefit it
conferred was a reward for sending children to sectarian
private schools, see Meek, 421 U.S. at 362-66, and to their students, see Wolman,
433 U.S. at 250-51, violate the primary effect test. In reaching these conclusions
the Court reasoned that the result did not depend on whether the state could
ensure that the materials would remain ideologically neutral. Meek and Wol-
man could perhaps be distinguished from the Minnesota-Rhode Island scheme
on the basis of the amount of indirect aid to the schools. See Meek; 421 U.S. at
365; Wolman, 433 U.S. at 233-34.
146. 413 U.S. at 789.
147. I& at 790 n.49.
148. Id. at 789.
149. See I.R.C. § 170 (1982).
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schools.150 The property tax exemption for religious institu-
tions upheld in Walz differed from a subsidy, the Court con-
cluded, because it was designed to prevent hostility to, rather
than to subsidize, religion. 5 1 Because tuition tax credits re-
ward attendance at religious schools whether they are fixed in
amount or vary with actual expenditures, this reading of Ny-
quist supports the Norberg court's invalidation of the Rhode Is-
land scheme.
A later Supreme Court decision and general tax theory
both tend to confirm the latter interpretation of Nyquist. In
Grit v. Wolman, 152 the Court summarily affirmed the invalida-
tion of a system of tax credits for nonpublic school parents in
which the amount of credit depended on the amount of tuition
paid. Although this tax benefit scheme was a credit against tax
rather than a deduction from adjusted gross income, it lacked
the arbitrariness the Court emphasized in Nyquist.153 Grit sug-
gests that the distinction between arbitrary credits and true de-
ductions is less important than the language in Nyquist might
imply.
Tax policy considerations also support this conclusion. De-
ductions, credits, and other "special tax provisions" 5 4 are
designed either to measure and define net income or to subsi-
dize and stimulate taxpayer behavior. 5 5 Net income is defined
by deducting from gross receipts the expenses incurred in gen-
erating those receipts.156 Under this analysis, tuition tax deduc-
tions for parents of children attending nonpublic schools do not
serve to define net income, for tuition costs do not help parents
earn their income. 5 7 In fact, tuition costs at the elementary
150. 413 U.S. at 786.
151. Id. at 793.
152. 413 U.S. 901 (1973).
153. See Kosydar v. Wolman, 353 F. Supp. 744, 750 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (explain-
ing that statute provides a dollar-for-dollar offset of tax liability, up to $90 per
pupil).
154. See Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Governmental
Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L REv.
705, 706-07 (1970).
155. See McNulty, Tax Policy and Tuition Credit Legislation: Federal In-
come Tax Allowances for Personal Costs of Higher Education; 61 CAL. L REv. 1,
16-18, 70-74 (1973); Wolfman, The Cost of Education and the Federal Income
Tax, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-NINTH ANNuAL JuDICiAL CONFERENCE, TEnw
JUDICIAL CIRcurr OF THE UNrrED STATES, reprinted in 42 F.IRD. 535, 539 (1966).
156. See McNulty, supra note 155, at 80; Wolfman, supra note 155, at 539.
157. See Wolfman, supra note 155, at 539. Some arguments can be made
that an executive needs to send his or her children to college as an "ordinary"
business expense because the executive's "status" in the business organization
depends upon his or her ability to satisfy such social expectations as sending
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and secondary school level reflect parents' consumption
choices, based on their academic, religious, or social prefer-
ences.158 These costs are personal expenses, which are gener-
ally disallowed as deductions under federal law.'5 9 Hence, the
tuition tax deduction scheme at issue in Norberg and Mueller,
like other tuition tax relief provisions, constitutes a subsidy
and not an attempt to define net income.160
Under this analysis, the Mueller court should not have used
the credit-deduction distinction' 6 ' when applying the primary
effect test to the Minnesota tuition deduction. The Eighth Cir-
cuit attempted to distinguish the tax relief invalidated in Ny-
quis;162 because the Minnesota scheme, unlike New York's,
did not reflect a legislative attempt to assure that "each" family
would receive a "carefully estimated" net benefit.163 The de-
duction provision makes no sense, however, unless the Minne-
sota legislature intended to provide most tuition paying parents
with some net benefit. The exclusion of a few families from
benefits and the lack of a precise formula to calculate each fam-
ily's net benefit does not alleviate the Supreme Court's funda-
mental objection to the Nyquist tax relief provision, that the
money "represents a charge made upon the state for the pur-
pose of religious education." 6 4 Hence, the crucial issue raised
by Mueller and Norberg is not whether a tuition tax deduction
is constitutionally more permissible than a tuition tax credit,
but whether broadening the beneficiary class to include public
school parents who pay tuition distinguishes the disputed stat-
utory scheme from tuition tax relief benefiting only nonpublic
school parents.
C. THE BREADTH OF THE BENEFITED CLASS
Walz and Nyquist do not resolve the dispute between the
one's children to college. Id& A much better argument can be made for al-
lowing a deduction for the student, computed by capitalizing the student's edu-
cational expenses and amortizing them over the useful life of the education.
See McNulty, supra note 155, at 16-36. Compared with higher education ex-
penditures, however, expenditures for private elementary and secondary edu-
cation reflect a consumption decision, not an income producing investment
decision. See Wolfman, supra note 155, at 551.
158. See Wolfan, supra note 155, at 551.
159. Treas. Reg. § 1.261-1 (1982); 3 FED. TAXES (P-H) 16,655 (1982).
160. See McNulty, supra note 155, at 80; Wolfman, supra note 155, at 540.
161. 676 F.2d at 1203.
162. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
163. 676 F.2d at 1204.
164. Nyquist 413 U.S. at 791 (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 350 F. Supp. 655, 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (Hays, J., dissenting)).
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First and Eighth Circuits over the significance of the breadth of
the class benefited by tuition tax deductions. Although breadth
of class was one factor the Nyquist Court used to distinguish
Walz, 165 the opinion did not clearly indicate whether the de
jure or the de facto class was intended. In contrasting the two
statutes, the Nyquist Court emphasized the narrow de facto
class benefited by the tax credits16 6 but mentioned only the
broad de jure class eligible for the property tax exemption up-
held in Walz.167 This apparent ambiguity might merely reflect
the lack of statistical evidence available to the Walz Court re-
garding the breadth of the de facto class.168 On the other hand,
when the Nyquist Court intimated in a footnote that a statute
which made scholarships generally available might be constitu-
tional, it was apparently referring to a broad de jure class.169
This ambiguity in Nyquist has not been resolved by the Court's
subsequent tax benefit decisions,170 which have dealt only with
statutes benefiting classes which were de jure narrow as well
as de facto narrow.171 Thus, the Supreme Court's decisions do
not clearly resolve the Norberg-Mueller debate over the signifi-
cance of de facto and de jure classes.
In addition, Walz and Nyquist do not answer the question
whether a broad beneficiary class is sufficient by itself to
render a tuition tax benefit constitutional. The Nyquist Court
distinguished Walz on three grounds besides the difference in
breadth of the benefited classes. The property tax exemptions
in Walz, unlike the tuition tax credits in Nyquist, had a long
history of acceptance 172 the exemptions were designed to pre-
vent hostility to religion, whereas the tuition credits subsidized
religion; 7 3 and the exemptions, unlike the tuition credits, were
less entangling than the alternative of taxation.174 The Court
expressly declined to say whether the breadth of the benefited
165. See 413 U.S. at 794. See also supra text accompanying note 95.
166. See 413 U.S. at 794.
167. See id.
168. See Walz 397 U.S. at 666-67.
169. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 783 n.38.
170. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. United Americans for Pub. Schools, 419 U.S.
890 (1974); Public Funds for Pub. Schools v. Byrne, 590 F.2d 514, 516 (3d Cir.),
aff'd mem, 442 U.S. 907 (1979); Kosyder v. Wolman, 353 F. Supp. 744, 766 (S.D.
Ohio 1972), aff'd sub nom. Grit v. Wolman, 413 U.S. 901 (1973); Minnesota Civil
Liberties Union v. State, 302 Minn. 216, 233, 224 N.W.2d 344, 353 (1974), cert de-
nied, 421 U.S. 988 (1975).
171. See supra note 91.
172. 413 U.S. at 792. See also supra text accompanying note 93.
173. 413 U.S. at 793. See also supra text accompanying note 94.
174. 413 U.S. at 793.
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class would be dispositive in some situations,175 and it has not
yet addressed that issue in subsequent school aid cases. Thus,
the Court's opinions do not favor either Norberg's focus on
breadth of class or Mueller's approach of weighing this factor
along with other considerations.
Although the Supreme Court case law offers little assist-
ance in assessing the constitutionality of the Rhode Island-Min-
nesota scheme of deductions, an examination of the principles
underlying the establishment clause points to a solution. It is
perhaps idle to speculate on the purposes for which the estab-
lishment clause was originally adopted.176 Nevertheless, agree-
ment among the Supreme Court and commentators as to the
principles embodied in the clause is sufficiently great to guide
the decision of the Norberg-Mueller conflict. Although the es-
tablishment clause may serve other goals, it certainly protects
political equality among religions,177 church autonomy,178 and
religious liberty.179 Together these principles point toward the
175. Id. at 794.
176. See, e.g., Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishmen4 and Doctrinal
Development- Part . The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HAV. L. REV. 513,
516 (1968) ("It is impossible to find substantial agreement among scholars as to
what political principles are embodied in the establishment clause."). Some
commentators maintain that the establishment clause was intended only to
prevent a nationally established church. See, e.g., Kruse, The Historical Mean-
ing and Judicial Construction of the Establishment of Religion Clause of the
First Amendmen4 2 WAsHBuRx L.J. 65, 84-85, 127-30 (1962); Murray, Law or Pre-
possessions 14 LAw & CONrMP. PROB. 23, 41-43 (1940); Snee, Religious Dises-
tablishment and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1954 WASH. U.LQ. 371, 373-94.
Commentators have also presented historical evidence that the Framers in-
tended only to prevent legal constraints on freedom of conscience and the free
exercise of religion. See M. HowE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 19 (1965);
Murray, supra, at 30-31, 41-43. The Supreme Court has rejected both of these
positions while acknowledging the historical support for them. See Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 253-55 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430-35 (1962). Regardless of the Framers' original
intent in adopting the establishment clause, the subsequent growth of the
state's role in allocating resources and structuring the social order has caused
the issue of church-state involvement to become fundamentally different from
that confronting the Framers. Giannella, supra, at 514-15.
177. "Neither a state nor the Federal Government... can pass laws which
aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another." Everson
v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1974). See also Giannella, supra note 176, at
517; Merel, The Protection of Individual Choice: A Consistent Understanding of
Religion Under the First Amendmen 45 U. CH. L. REv. 805, 810 (1978).
178. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 266 n.7 (1977) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (aid to private schools harms religion by
forcing schools to relinquish religious exclusivity and avoid textbooks which
present a religious perspective on secular subjects). See also M. HOWE, supra
note 176, at 19; Giannella, supra note 176, at 517; Katz, Radiations from Church
Tax Exemption, 1970 Sup. CT. REV. 93, 97.
179. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
19831
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
breadth of the de facto benefited class as the pivotal factor in
cases involving tax benefits that aid religious institutions.
By ensuring political equality among religious sects, the es-
tablishment clause protects against the political ascendancy of
one religious sect over another.180 Although some degree of
religious influence on politics is necessary and proper, the es-
tablishment clause helps to insulate the political process from
interfaith rivalry.181 Legislation that primarily aids sectarian
education disrupts political equality and promotes rivalry
among religious sects by favoring those groups that emphasize
private primary and secondary education.182 Narrowly sectar-
ian aid also gives rise to recurrent dissension among religious
sects over the allocation of public monies, because religious
See also Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools 56
CAL L. REV. 260, 267-68 (1968); Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82
HARv. L. REV. 1680, 1684 (1969); Giannella, supra note 176, at 517.
180. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 694 (opinion of Harlan, J.); Note,
Government Noninvolvement with Religious Institutions, 59 TEx. L REV. 921,
928 n.51 (1980).
181. Walk 397 U.S. at 695 (opinion of Harlan, J.). See also Freund, supra
note 179, at 1692; Giannella, supra note 176, at 517.
182. Sectarian groups are not new in America. On the eve of the Revolu-
tion, the groups were "numerous" and "universal." B. BAILYN, EDUCATION IN
THE FORMING OF AMERICAN SocIrETY 39-40 (1972). Even the established
churches lacked legal authority to compel allegiance, and all sects faced the
threat of erosion, particularly among the young. Id. Out of this context arose
the sectarian school whose mission was to "[aid] one group to survive in a
world of differing groups." Id.
A similar motivation was behind the rise of Catholic elementary and secon-
dary schools in the 1830's and 1840's. Some Catholic commentators emphasize
the relationship between the rise of the public school movement of that era, the
first large influx of Irish Catholics, and the growth of nativist groups such as
the "No-Nothing Party." House Hearings, supra note 1, at 227 (statement by
Marilyn Lundy, President, Citizens for Educational Freedom). These commen-
tators charge that the early public schools, founded by Protestants, exuded
Protestant values through school prayers, reading of the King James version of
the Bible, the observance of Protestant holidays, and the nonobservance of
Catholic and Jewish holidays. 124 CONG. REC. 25,813 (1978) (statement by Sen.
Moynihan). The Catholic perception of public schools as Protestant dominated
helps explain the growth of Roman Catholic private elementary and secondary
schools.
Another highly vocal group favoring tuition tax relief consists of evangeli-
cal Christian schools. 124 CONG. REC. 26,090 (1978) (statement of Sen. Helms).
The common mission of Catholic and evangelical Christian schools seems
ironic, for Catholic schools have rejected public schools because of their
Protestant flavor, while evangelical Christian schools reject public schools be-
cause that Protestant atmosphere has dissipated in the wake of Supreme Court
rulings outlawing school prayer and Bible reading. Id. at 25,810 (statement of
Sen. Packwood). Both Catholic and evangelical Christian schools, however,
share the pressure of rising costs, and now other sectarian schools have joined
in the common quest for school aid. Jewish Day Schools, Episcopalians, and
Missouri Synod Lutherans are the most numerous groups. Morgan, supra note
1, at 59. See also 124 CONG. Rac. 25,663 (1978).
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groups will lobby the legislature to maintain or increase aid.183
In contrast, aid which broadly benefits secular as well as sec-
tarian groups is less likely to generate interfaith rivalries or im-
balances of power. Even if only some sects receive aid directly,
members of other faiths will probably benefit as members of
the broader legislative class. Because particular religious
groups will not be perceived as the primary beneficiaries of
state aid, competition among sects for government funds will
also be reduced.
Legislation that primarily aids sectarian groups indirectly
threatens to violate churches' autonomy over their religious af-
fairs. Such aid subtly pressures sectarian schools to become
more secular, for as schools attempt to persuade state legisla-
tures to maintain or increase the aid, they may alter their cur-
ricula to create an appearance of secularity, at the expense of
their religious uniqueness. Justice Stevens noted the danger of
government intrusion when he wrote, "I would add emphasis to
the pernicious tendency of a state subsidy to tempt religious
schools to compromise their religious mission without wholly
abandoning it."184 An example of this phenomenon is direct
aid to nonpublic schools in British Columbia, which has had a
dramatically negative effect on nonpublic students' and par-
ents' perceptions of their schools' uniqueness, responsiveness,
and social cohesion.185 Aid narrowly directed to sectarian
schools thus tends to destroy the very diversity and unique-
ness which it purports to preserve. In contrast, legislation that
generally aids education does not affect church autonomy in
religious affairs. If sectarian schools are not the primary bene-
ficiaries, there will be less pressure on sectarian schools to
avoid the appearance of constitutional impropriety by becom-
ing more secular.
Aid directed primarily to sectarian schools infringes reli-
gious liberty by forcing individual taxpayers to support reli-
gious faiths to which they do not adhere.186 Admittedly,
general aid to education which includes religious schools would
also use some taxpayers' dollars to aid religions they do not
choose to support. The general nature of the aid makes this in-
183. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 59.
184. Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 775 (1976) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
185. House Hearings, supra note 1, at 295 (statement of Robert Lamborn,
President, Board of Directors, Institute for the Study of Private Schools).
186. See House Hearings, supra note 1, at 49 (statement of Professor Leo
Pfeffer).
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fringement on religious liberty more tolerable for two reasons,
however. First, the breadth of the de facto class tends to show
that the purpose of the law is not to benefit religion specifically
but to achieve a broader social goal. Thus, the aid taxpayers'
dollars provide to religious institutions is incidental to the pur-
pose of the legislation,187 so it is less clear than in the case of
narrowly drawn aid that taxpayers' religious liberty is in-
fringed. Second, to eliminate the possible infringement result-
ing from this incidental benefit, the legislature would have to
amend the general legislation to exclude all aid to religious in-
stitutions. This type of amendment would actively discrimi-
nate against religion, however; and the establishment clause is
designed in part to prevent government hostility to sectarian
groups. 88
The Eighth Circuit counseled against "blind adherence" to
the importance of the breadth of the de facto beneficiary
class,189 concluding instead that a state may extend benefits
without regard to the religious beliefs of the beneficiaries,190 if
the benefits have a public purpose and fulfill a public need.'9 '
The court maintained that state provision of a deduction for tu-
ition paying public school parents could be deemed a public
need.192 Hence, the Court hypothesized that a state should be
able to extend this benefit to parochial school parents in order
to equalize benefits.93 Nyquist explicitly rejected this argu-
ment, however. The Court in Nyquist noted that the grants to
private school parents augmented their children's right to re-
ceive free public education,194 and added:
[Tihe argument proves too much, for it would also provide a basis for
approving through tuition grants the complete subsidization of all reli-
gious schools on the ground that such action is necessary if the State is
fully to equalize the position of parents who elect such schools-a re-
sult wholly at variance with the Establishment Clause.195
The Eighth Circuit failed to recognize that, if a state may grant
187. For example, provision of police, fire, and sewer services for churches
or church schools arguably benefits religion, but these services do not benefit
religion more than businesses or residences. See, e.g., Everson, 330 U.S. at 60-61
(Rutledge, J., dissenting).
188. If a state were to deny a religion police and fire protection, the denial
would pose a free exercise dilemma, as the state protection would be withheld
because of religious beliefs. See Giannella, supra note 176, at 520-21.
189. 676 F.2d at 1205.
190. Id. (quoting Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947)).
191. 676 F.2d at 1205.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. 413 U.S. at 782 n.38.
195. Id- (emphasis in original).
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benefits exclusively to religious schools for the purpose of ex-
tending benefits previously given only to public schools, then
the only limit on state aid to religion will be the legislature's
imagination and resourcefulness in finding public school "bene-
fits" that must be "equalized." If the establishment clause is to
provide any meaningful limit on state aid to religion, this result
is untenable.
IV. A PROPOSED STANDARD FOR ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE REVIEW OF TAX BENEFITS THAT AID
RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS
The preceding analysis led to the conclusion that the diecid-
ing factor in cases involving tax benefits that aid religious insti-
tutions should be the proportion of actual beneficiaries whose
benefits result from religious activity. To be viable, however,
this criterion must be elaborated.
A. DEFINING DISPROPORTIONATE BENEFRT
The Mueller court concluded that a statistical definition of
disproportionate benefit would be unnecessarily rigid.196 Any
maximum permissible percentage of religious beneficiaries
would be arbitrary and inappropriate in light of the constitu-
tional status of the criterion. 97 For example, the constitution-
ality of a statute might vary from year to year depending on a
statistical breakdown of sectarian and nonsectarian institutions
benefited by the legislation.198 Another problem, not men-
tioned by the Mueller court, is that a purely statistical approach
assigns no relative weight to sectarian and nonsectarian benefi-
ciaries. The legislature might, for example, believe that benefit-
ing a relatively small secular class is very important, but it
might extend benefits to sectarian groups as well, merely to
avoid discriminating against religion. Under a purely statistical
criterion, however, such a statute would be invalid. It seems
that some less rigid definition of disproportionate benefit is
required.
The district court in Norberg concluded that Rhode Island's
extension of the law to include five percent secular benefi-
ciaries amounted to "mere window dressing." 99 This observa-
tion suggests a more workable definition of disproportionate
196. 697 F.2d at 1200-01 nL13.
197. Id.
198. IE
199. Norberg, 479 F. Supp. 13864, 1371 (D.Rl. 1979).
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benefit. It is likely that underlying the district court's conclu-
sion was the belief that the primary purpose of the law was to
provide relief for parents of sectarian school children. In keep-
ing with this approach, a definition of disproportionate benefit
should invalidate any law which has no substantial purpose
other than to aid religious institutions, even if its purpose is
"secular" under the Court's current test. 00 The following defi-
nition of disproportionate benefit achieves this result. Tax ben-
efit legislation disproportionately aids religious institutions if
and only if the state would not have a substantial interest in
enacting the legislation if the legislation excluded all benefits
to religious institutions. Thus, legislation is sufficiently broad
to pass constitutional muster only if the government's interest
in the legislation does not depend on the benefits it provides to
religious institutions. The virtue of this definition is its flex-
ibility. It establishes no statistical threshold for constitutional-
ity and thus allows courts to assess the weight the legislature
assigns to secular and sectarian benefits.
B. SCOPE OF THE CRITERION
The proposed criterion should cover all cases involving tax
benefits that aid religious institutions. Thus, in addition to tax
relief for school related expenses, this test would apply to tax
exemptions for religious institutions such as those upheld in
Walz, 20 and to charitable deductions.202 The criterion thus
bridges the gap between Walz and Nyquist2 03 by explaining
why a broad de facto class such as the one presumed in
Walz2 04 should be valid but why a broad de jure but narrow de
facto class such as the one involved in the Rhode Island-Minne-
sota scheme205 should not. In addition, this criterion answers
the objection, raised by the Mueller court,206 that a purely sta-
tistical analysis should not be sufficient to invalidate tax laws
providing charitable deductions. Even if it could be shown that
the majority of such deductions were claimed for contributions
to religious institutions, there might be a substantial govern-
ment interest in encouraging contributions to secular charities,
200. See supra text accompanying notes 35-38 for discussion of the Court's
present "secular purpose" test.
201. 397 U.S. 664, 666 (1970). See supra text accompanying notes 73-82.
202. See, e.g., LIRC. § 170 (1982).
203. See supra text accompanying notes 165-75.
204. 397 U.S. at 666-67 & n.1; Nyquist 413 U.S. at 794.
205. See supra notes 116-34 and accompanying text.
206. 676 F.2d at 1200-01 n.13.
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especially if the legislature hoped to increase secular charitable
giving through enacting the deduction.
This criterion should not, however, be extended to apply to
aid other than tax benefits. If the breadth of benefited class
analysis were used to validate construction and maintenance
grants207 or funds for instructional materials,208 the state could
subsidize virtually any improvement in religious education, as
long as it could demonstrate a substantial interest in making
similar improvements in secular education. Strictly speaking,
this sort of program would not be the same as the complete
subsidization of religious education decried in dicta in Ny-
quist.209 Nevertheless, application of the breadth of class test
to direct grants to schools would permit complete subsidization
of all improvements in religious education which accompany
identical improvements in secular education. This result seems
as inconsistent with the establishment clause as the complete
subsidization the Nyquist dicta rejected.
C. THE DISPROPORTIONATE BENEFT CRITERION AND THE THREE
PRONG TEST
The proposed disproportionate benefit test is, in effect, a
criterion for determining the primary effect of tax benefits
which, in part, aid religious institutions. Courts should use this
criterion only to decide whether challenged tax benefits pro-
vide purely incidental aid to religion and thus are distinguish-
able from the tax credits the Nyquist Court held had the
primary effect of aiding religion.210 Thus, a relief scheme which
benefits a broad class of beneficiaries may still be invalidated
under the excessive entanglement test. For example, if the
textbook and instructional materials deductions in the Rhode
Island and Minnesota statutes had benefited a broad de facto
class, the statutes would still be invalid under the excessive en-
tanglement test.2 1 To determine whether the textbooks and
materials met the statutory requirement that they not be reli-
gious in character, the state would have had to engage in the
207. See, e.g., Nyquist 413 U.S. at 774-80 (invalidating state maintenance and
repair grants to sectarian elementary and secondary schools).
208. See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
209. 413 U.S. at 782 n.38. See supra text accompanying notes 194-95. The
"equalization" in Nyquist consisted of states acting to redress a presently ex-
isting inequality of position between public and nonpublic schools or parents.
413 U.S. at 782 n.38. The "equalization" referred to in the text consists of states
making simultaneous grants to both public and nonpublic schools or parents.
210. 413 U.S. at 793.
211. See supra notes 135-45 and accompanying text.
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continuing surveillance which the Norberg court correctly con-
cluded would ultimately lead to excessive church-state
entanglement.2 12
V. CONCLUSION
In the first major Supreme Court establishment clause case
in 1947, Justice Rutledge foretold the future of establishment
clause litigation with uncanny accuracy:
Two great drives are constantly in motion to abridge, in the name of
education, the complete division of religion and civil authority which
our forefathers made. One is to introduce religious education and ob-
servances into the public schools. The other, to obtain private funds
for the aid and support of various private religious schools. 213
Recent congressional efforts to reinstate prayer in public
schools illustrate the continuing vitality of the first "great
drive."214 Federal tuition tax credit initiatives215 and the tuition
tax deduction schemes considered in Norberg and Mueller
show that the second "great drive" is also alive and well.
The persistence of the legislative desire to aid private
schools, however, does not necessarily imply that these meas-
ures will or should be found constitutionally permissible. The
tuition tax deduction scheme challenged in Norberg and Muel-
ler cannot be adequately distinguished from the tuition tax
credit statute the Supreme Court invalidated in Nyquist. The
Supreme Court could greatly clarify the scope of permissible
state aid to private education through tax benefits by applying
the proposed disproportionate benefit criterion to assess pri-
mary effect in such cases. This approach would provide a work-
able and familiar test while avoiding the arbitrary results a
rigid statistical analysis would yield.
212. 630 F.2d at 861-62. See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
213. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 63 (1947) (Rutledge, J,
dissenting).
214. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 199, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. S5428 (daily
ed. May 18, 1982) (proposing constitutional amendment that nothing in the
Constitution shall be construed to prohibit prayer in public schools).
215. See, e.g., H.R. 5796, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CoNG. REc. H822 (daily ed.
March 10, 1982) (introducing bill to amend Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to
provide a federal income tax credit for tuition).
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